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Applying the Market Participant Exception to Selective
Purchasing Laws That Affect Foreign Commerce
Relations: Reading Between the Lines of National
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios
Michelle C. Sarruff*
On June 19, 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.' Affirming the First
Circuit's decision in National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,2 the
Supreme Court in Crosby held that the "Massachusetts Burma Law,"3
a Massachusetts selective purchasing law, was unconstitutional
because it violated the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution4 .
The Massachusetts legislature enacted the Burma Law in 1996 to
condemn the human rights violations occurring in Myanmar (formally
Burma).' The law essentially prohibited the state from contracting
with businesses that "do business with Burma. ,6
* J.D. Seattle University School of Law. Thanks to Professor Ronald C. Slye and Professor
David Engdahl for their insight and encouragement.
1. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
2. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
3. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (1996).
4. The Supremacy Clause provides as follows:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
5. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 46-47. Burma is now called "Myanmar," but for purposes of this
Note, I will use the name "Burma," as the courts and the parties involved in this suit chose to do
SO.
6. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 44.
1151
Seattle University Law Review
In Natsios, the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), a
coalition of business groups, alleged that the Massachusetts Burma
Law was unconstitutional because it (1) violated the Supremacy
Clause;7 (2) violated the Foreign Commerce Clause;8 and (3)
unconstitutionally interfered with the foreign affairs power9 of the
federal government. The First Circuit agreed with NFTC, holding
that the law was unconstitutional on all three grounds.10
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, relying exclusively on
the Supremacy Clause, held that the Massachusetts law was
unconstitutional."1 In doing so, the Supreme Court wrongly left
unresolved the question of whether the "market participant exception"
to the dormant Commerce Clause can be applied to allow a state to
freely exclude business partners that it finds objectionable." Rather,
the Court should have held that when acting in the role of a market
participant, a government is allowed to choose its own business
partners, regardless of whether its choice is based on a moral or
economic reason, and regardless of whether the business partners are
foreign or domestic. 3 Such a holding is supported by the justifications
for the market participant exception, a judicially created doctrine
imposed to limit the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause. These
justifications, including fairness and a need to avoid interference with
state autonomy, apply consistently to transactions in both domestic
and foreign commerce.
14
In this Note, I will examine the background of the situation in
Burma as well as the federal and state legislation passed in response to
the atrocities occurring within Burma's borders. I will then address
the First Circuit's holding that the Massachusetts Burma Law is
unconstitutional, focusing on the court's foreign Commerce Clause
analysis and failure to apply the market participant exception. Finally,
I will discuss the history of and the justifications for the market
7. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. The federal government's foreign affairs power is not mentioned expressly in the text of
the Constitution. Rather, it is "derived from the structure of the Constitution an the nature of
federalism." Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Low, 240 F.3d 739, 751-52 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L.
832, 836-37 (1989)).
10. See generally Natsios, 181 F.3d 38.
11. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
12. In Natsios, the First Circuit addressed all three arguments raised by NFTC. For this
reason, most of this Note will discuss the First Circuit's opinion in the Natsios case.
13. Unless, of course, a reason for exclusion rests on the basis of discrimination against a
protected class, or, if in exclusion, the government is somehow denying a fundamental right.
14. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989).
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participant exception, exploring how the exception should be applied
in the context of foreign commerce.
In my analysis, I will focus on the dormant Commerce Clause
and the market participant exception because of the implications these
doctrines may have for future situations. For example, would a state
or local government be barred from passing a selective purchasing law
if there were no preemptive federal law involved? The outcome of
such a case may depend on a proper application of the dormant
Commerce Clause and the market participant exception. The courts
have not yet decided this issue, but it is almost certain to arise in the
near future, especially as markets become increasingly globalized.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Human Rights Violations in Burma
Situated in Southeast Asia, Burma is bordered by China, Laos,
Thailand, and India. The British colonized Burma in 1886, and it
later gained independence in 1948." Burma enjoyed a brief period of
parliamentary democracy until 1962, when the military, under
General Ne Win, took power, and the Burma Socialist Programme
Party (BSPP) became the official party of the new government.
16
Under Ne Win's control, Burma entered a period of isolationism. Ne
Win rejected investments by Western and other foreign governments
and nationalized Burmese banks, the import/export trade, and retail
and industrial businesses. 7 During Ne Win's military reign, the
Burmese economy collapsed. 8 By 1987, Burma had gone from being
the "rice bowl of Asia" to the United Nation's "Least Developed
Country." 9
By 1988, economic stagnation and the suppression of political
freedom transformed general discontent into a nationwide mass
movement. 2' As a result of this movement, the military, in September
of 1988, announced a coup and established the State Law and Order
15. International Labour Organization, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Appointed Under
Article 26 of the Constitution of the International Labour Organization to Examine the Observance by
Myanmar of the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (July 2, 1998) <http://www.ilo.org/





20. Id. Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of independence leader Aung San, emerged as the
leader of this movement.
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Restoration Council (SLORC).2" Under the SLORC regime, the
sociopolitical atmosphere in Burma continued to deteriorate.
22
A 1996 International Labor Organization (ILO) report confirms
that under SLORC rule, Burmese authorities forced the men, women
and children of Burma to carry out a variety of labor-intensive tasks.
Not only did the authorities fail to compensate these workers, but they
also subjected them to various forms of verbal, sexual, and physical
abuse including rape, torture, and death. 24  Harsh penalties were
imposed for any failure to comply with forced labor:
Punishments included detention at the army camp, often in leg-
stocks or in a pit in the ground, commonly accompanied by
beatings and other forms of torture, as well as deprivation of
food, water, medical attention and other basic rights. Women
were subject to rape and other forms of sexual abuse at such
times.
25
While forced labor has existed in Burma since at least 1988, the
use of forced labor for infrastructure-related projects appears to have
been much less common before 1992.26 However, in recent years, an
increasing number of Burmese have been subjected to forced labor.27
In 1995, Human Rights Watch/Asia estimated that from 1992 to
1995, at least two million people were forced to work on the
construction of roads, railways, and bridges without pay.
28
Additionally, the government forced civilians to work on a variety of
projects undertaken by Burmese authorities. It appears that these
projects, which included the cultivation and production of goods, were
undertaken for income-generation purposes.29 Many of these goods
were traded on the international market.3"
A second atrocity that is closely related to the increase in forced
labor is a pattern of unsustainable overuse of natural resources.31
Along with its exploitation of the Burmese people, the Burmese
government is attempting to fully exploit a substantial quantity of
mineral, fishing, and timber resources, resulting in widespread
21. Id.
22. Even though, in the spring of 1990, a tightly controlled election would have ended the
military coup's rise to power, the military declared the election void and continued to rule.











ecological devastation.32 Many of these resources are incorporated into
products that filter into international markets."
Both of these atrocities, forced labor and the exploitation of
natural resources, continue to occur in Burma, and the Burmese
people continue to suffer. With little hope of assistance from within
Burmese borders, it has become clear that the Burmese people need
outside assistance and support. In response to these atrocities,
Massachusetts took action and passed its Burma Law.
B. Federal Legislative Response to Burmese Human Rights Violations
Massachusetts was not alone in responding the human rights
violations in Burma. Congress, during the Clinton administration,
imposed sanctions on Burma three months after Massachusetts passed
its law.34 The federal legislation authorizing the sanctions includes
five components: (1) it bars any United States assistance to the
Government of Burma except for certain types of humanitarian
assistance; (2) it authorizes the President to impose conditional
sanctions by means of an executive order; (3) it instructs the President
to work with members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and other countries having major trading and investment
interest in Burma to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to
bring democracy to Burma and improve human rights practices and
the quality of life for its people; (4) it instructs the President to report
to Congress on conditions in Burma and on progress made in
furthering a multilateral strategy; and (5) it grants the President the
power to waive any of the sanctions if he or she determines and
certifies to Congress that the application of such sanctions would be
contrary to the national security interests of the United States.3"
In May 1997, President Clinton issued an Executive Order




34. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 1999).
35. See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 F.R. 28,301 (1997), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. §
1701 (Supp. 1997).
36. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 48. See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 F.R. 28,301 (1997), reprinted
as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (Supp. 1997). In Natsios, the National Foreign Trade Council
asserted that these federally imposed trade sanctions preempted the Massachusetts Burma Law,
and that the law thus violated the Supremacy Clause. Although this preemption argument may
have some validity, this Note will not focus on this issue.
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II. FACTS, PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND HOLDING IN NATIONAL
FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL V. NATSIOS
A. Facts
In 1996, Massachusetts enacted "An Act Regulating State
Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in Burma
(Myanmar)," which popularly became known as the Massachusetts
Burma Law. 7 In effect, the law prohibited Massachusetts and its
agents from purchasing goods or services from anyone doing business
with Burma.3" It did this by authorizing the Operational Services
Division (OSD), an agency within Massachusetts' Executive Office of
Administration and Finance, to establish a "restricted purchase list."39
This list was formed through an administrative process in which the
OSD would make a preliminary finding that a company was "doing
business with Burma," as defined by statute. 40  A company added to
the preliminary list would then be provided an opportunity to submit
a sworn affidavit to refute the finding.41 Finally, the OSD would make
a final decision whether to place that company on the restricted
purchase list.4
If a company were placed on the list, Massachusetts would be
prohibited from procuring goods or services from that company,
37. Natsios, 181 F.3dat 45.
38. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass. 1998).
The law defined "state agency" to include "all awarding authorities of the commonwealth,
including, but not limited to, all executive offices, agencies, departments, commissions, and
public institutions of higher education, and any office, department or division of the judiciary."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22G (1996).
39. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
40. Id.
Section 22 G defines "Doing Business with Burma" as:
(a) having a principal place of business, place of incorporation or its corporate
headquarters in Burma (Myanmar) or having any operations, leases, franchises,
majority-owned subsidiaries, distribution agreements, or any other similar agreements
in Burma, or being a majority owned subsidiary, licensee or franchise of such a
person;
(b) providing financial services to the government of Burma (Myanmar), including
providing direct loans, underwriting government securities, providing any consulting
advice or assistance, providing brokerage services, acting as a trustee or escrow agent,
or otherwise acting as an agent pursuant to a contractual agreement;
(c) promoting the importation or sale of gems, timber, oil gas or other related
products, commerce in which is largely controlled by the government of Burma
(Myanmar), from Burma (Myanmar);
(d) providing any goods or services to the government of Burma (Myanmar).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 22G (1996).




unless one of the statutory exceptions was available. 43  The first
exception included situations in which the "procurement [was]
essential" and the restriction "would eliminate the only bid or offer, or
would result in inadequate competition. ' 44  The second exception
involved the purchase by Massachusetts of certain medical supplies.4"
The final exception involved situations in which "there is no
comparable low bid or offer."46 These exceptions, however, occurred
infrequently.
The Massachusetts Burma Law had significant effects. There
were 346 companies, including forty-four American companies, on the
restricted purchase list at the time NFTC filed its complaint in federal
court alleging that the law was unconstitutional. 47  At least three of
these companies stopped doing business in Burma as a result of the
law.4' The law also had a snowballing effect: at least nineteen
municipal governments have subsequently enacted similar restrictive
purchasing laws. 49
In addition to the NFTC lawsuit, the Burma Law generated
protests from a number of international trading partners, including
ASEAN, Japan, and the European Communities (EC).5" The latter
two entities filed a complaint with the World Trade Organization's
dispute review panel."'
Although the statute itself is not explicit about its purpose, an
examination of the legislative history of the act reveals the intent of the
Massachusetts legislature.5 2 While introducing the bill that became
the Massachusetts Burma Law, Representative Byron Rushing, the
bill's sponsor, stated that the "identifiable goal" of the law was "free
democratic elections in Burma." 3 Additionally, when Massachusetts'
then Lieutenant Governor Paul Cellucci signed the bill, he made a
statement that clearly outlined the purpose of the legislation:
43. Id.
44. Id. § 22H (1996).
45. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 221 (1996).
46. Id. § 22G (1996). A "comparable low bid," is statutorily defined as one that is up to ten
percent higher than a bid from a company on the restricted list.
47. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 1999).
48. Id. A number of companies have withdrawn from Burma in recent years. At least
three of these companies cited the Massachusetts law as one of the reasons for their withdrawal.
49. Id. Some of these analogous laws affect nations other than Burma, including China,
Cuba, and Nigeria. Massachusetts, however, is the first and only state government to enact such
a law.
50. Id.
51. Supreme Court Review of "Burma Law" will Decide Local Sanction Power, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 30, 1999.
52. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46 (lst Cir. 1999).
53. Id.
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[D]ue to a steady flow of foreign investments, including those of
some United States companies, [the] brutal military regime [in
Burma] has been able to supply itself with weapons and portray
itself as the legitimate government of Burma. Today is the day
we call their bluff.54
Massachusetts' then Governor, William Weld, made an
additional comment that "one law passed by one state will not end the
suffering and oppression of the people of Burma, but it is my hope
that other states and Congress will follow our example, and make a
stand for the cause of freedom and democracy around the world. '""
Finally, Massachusetts clearly identified the purpose of the legislation
in its response to the NFTC complaint, asserting to the district court
that the law "expresses the Commonwealth's own disapproval of the
violations of human rights committed by the Burmese government"
and "contributes to the growing effort ... to apply indirect economic
pressure against the Burma regime for reform." 56 Massachusetts also
argued that the law reflected "the historic concerns of the citizens of
Massachusetts with supporting the rights of people around the
world. '5 7 Massachusetts did not argue that the law was designed to
provide any economic benefit to the state. 58
Although the purpose of the law is clear, whether it violates the
Foreign Commerce Clause remains in dispute and will be the topic of
discussion for the remainder of this Note.
B. Procedural History
NFTC is a nonprofit corporation that represents member
companies that engage in foreign trade.59 It filed suit on April 30,
1998, in the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Secretary of Administration and Finance and the State Purchasing
Agent for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." NFTC made three
initial arguments: (1) the Massachusetts Burma Law





58. Id. at 46-47.
59. Id. at 48. The First Circuit pointed out that thirty-four NFTC members are on the
"restricted purchase list."
60. Id. at 48. The Secretary at the time of the original suit was Charles D. Baker, who was
subsequently replaced by Frederick Laskey, who was subsequently replaced by Andrew S.
Natsios, the Secretary at the time the appeal was made.
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affairs power;6 1 (2) the statute was invalid because federal law
preempted the Massachusetts law; and (3) the law violated the Foreign
Commerce Clause6
The district court held that the Massachusetts Burma Law
unconstitutionally infringed on the foreign affairs power of the federal
government and, accordingly, granted declaratory and injunctive
relief.63 It did not consider NFTC's argument that the Massachusetts
law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.64 The district court did
find, however, that NFTC "[did] not [meet] its burden of showing
that the Federal Burma Law preempted the Massachusetts Burma
Law. 
65
Massachusetts appealed, and the case came before the First
Circuit in June of 1999.66 The First Circuit upheld the district court's
holding that the Massachusetts law violated the Constitution.67
Unlike the district court, however, the First Circuit addressed all three
of NFTC's arguments. It affirmed the district court's finding that the
Massachusetts Burma Law unconstitutionally interfered with the
foreign affairs power of the federal government. 68 It also held that the
Massachusetts Burma Law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause
and the Supremacy Clause.69
Massachusetts petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme
Court granted on November 29, 1999. 70 The Supreme Court affirmed
the First Circuit's holding that the Massachusetts Burma Law was
unconstitutional on the basis of the Supremacy Clause. 71 The Court
did not, however, address the other arguments raised by NFTC,
including the dormant Commerce Clause argument and
Massachusetts' market participant exception counter-argument:
Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts with federal
law is sufficient to affirm the judgment below, we decline to
speak to field preemption as a separate issue, or to pass on the
First Circuit's rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.72
61. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291-93 (D. Mass. 1998).
62. Id. at 293.
63. Id. at 289.
64. Id. at 293.
65. Id.
66. See National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 49 (1st Cir. 1999).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 45.
69. Id.
70. Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
71. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
72. Id. at 374 n.8 (citations omitted).
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As the Supreme Court declined to rule on the dormant
Commerce Clause issue, the remainder of this Note will focus
exclusively on the portion of the First Circuits' decision in Natsios
dealing with the Commerce Clause.
C. The First Circuit's Holding in Natsios
The First Circuit held that the Massachusetts law violated the
Foreign Commerce Clause because it facially discriminated against
foreign commerce, interfered with the federal government's ability to
speak with one voice, and attempted to regulate conduct beyond its
borders.73 Furthermore, the First Circuit reasoned it was unlikely that
the market participant exception applies to the Foreign Commerce
Clause, and, even if it did, the court concluded that Massachusetts
was not acting as a market participant.
74
The First Circuit began its analysis by detailing the basis for the
"dormant" Foreign Commerce Clause:
[The] Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce with Foreign nations, and among the several States."
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. It has long been understood, as well
to provide "protection from state legislation inimical to the
national commerce [even] where Congress has not acted. 71
The First Circuit then relied on a 1992 Supreme Court opinion
and ruled that "[a]bsent a compelling justification ... a State may not
advance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against
foreign commerce.
76
In holding that the law violated the Foreign Commerce Clause
because it facially discriminated against foreign commerce, the First
Circuit rejected Massachusetts' argument that the law did not
distinguish between foreign and domestic companies.7 7  The court
stressed that a "law need not be designed to further local economic
73. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 66 (1st Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 62, 65.
75. Id. at 61-62 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board Of
California, 512 U.S. at 310 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945) (alterations in original))).
76. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 66 (quoting Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and
Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 81 (1992)).
77. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67. Massachusetts relied on Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) and Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 505 U.S.
71, 82 (1992) to make this argument. Massachusetts argued that the holdings in these cases
require "that the law must distinguish between foreign and domestic producers in order to be
held facially invalid." Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67. It also argued that the crucial factor in
determining whether a law discriminates is not whether the law singles out a particular foreign
state, but rather whether it discriminates "in favor of in-state businesses." Id.
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interest in order to run afoul of the Commerce Clause."78
Relying on Kraft Foods v. Iowa Department of Revenue and
Finances,9 the First Circuit also explicitly rejected the argument that
"local favoritism is crucial to a finding that a law is facially
discriminatory."" ° Further, the court ruled that "state laws that are
designed to limit trade with a specific foreign nation are precisely one
type of law that the Foreign Commerce Clause is designed to
prevent."" The court stressed that this rule was especially applicable
to the Massachusetts law because "the law has clearly more than just
foreign resonances ... a chief goal of the Massachusetts law is to affect
business decisions pertaining to a foreign nation. '"82 This ruling was
based on the assumption that "[w]hen the Constitution speaks of
foreign commerce, it is not referring only to attempts to regulate the
conduct of foreign companies; it is also referring to attempts to restrict
the actions of American companies overseas."83
The court articulated that the second reason the law violated the
Foreign Commerce Clause was because it interfered with the ability of
the "federal government to speak with one voice."84  Judge Lynch,
speaking for the First Circuit, made certain to distinguish this line of
reasoning from a similar analysis the court used when holding that the
law violated the foreign affairs power:
Independent of any claim under [the foreign affairs power], the
Supreme Court decisions in Japan Line and Container Corp.
make clear that a state law can violate the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause by impeding the federal government's ability
to "speak with one voice" in Foreign affairs, because such state
action harms "federal uniformity in an area where federal
uniformity is essential.,
8 1
Thus, the First Circuit rejected Massachusetts' argument that
78. Id..
79. 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
80. Id. The Natsios court was relying on the Kraft Court's statement that it was "not
persuaded ... that such favoritism is an essential element of a violation of the Foreign
Commerce Clause .... As the absence of local benefit does not eliminate the international
implications of the discrimination, it cannot exempt such discrimination from Commerce Clause
prohibitions." Kraft, 505 U.S. at 79.
81. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 67 (relying on Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 194 (1983) and Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1979)).
82. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 68.
83. Id. In making this assumption, the court reasoned that "[1]ong standing Supreme
Court Precedent indicates that the Framers were concerned with 'discrimination favorable or
adverse to commerce with particular foreign nations [under] state laws."' Id. (citing Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 317 (1851)).
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49; Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 193).
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the "one voice" test was no longer valid.86
Finally, the court ruled that Massachusetts was
unconstitutionally attempting to regulate conduct beyond its
borders.87 The court analogized domestic dormant Commerce Clause
cases to come to this conclusion.88 It held that:
Massachusetts may not regulate conduct wholly beyond its
borders. Yet the Massachusetts Burma Law-by conditioning
state procurement decisions on conduct that occurs in Burma-
does just that.... The "critical inquiry" here is "whether the
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State." Because we find that the
Massachusetts Burma Law has such an effect, and is not
otherwise shielded by the market participant exception, we find
that the law violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.
89
After the court determined that the law discriminated on its face
in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause, the court acknowledged
that the Massachusetts law could still be found legitimate if it
advanced "a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served
by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." 9' The court
determined, however, that Massachusetts had not attempted to
demonstrate such a purpose. 9'
The court also vigorously rejected Massachusetts' argument that
the market participant exception should apply.92 Again relying on
domestic doimant Commerce Clause cases, the court reasoned that
because this case did not involve "a discrete activity focused on a
single industry," the market participant exception was inapplicable.93
It also concluded that Massachusetts' creation of the selective
86. Id.
87. Id. at 69.
88. The court relied on several cases in its analysis, including BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571-72 (1996) (holding that "one State's power to impose burdens on the
interstate market is not only subordinate to the federal power over interstate commerce but is
also contained by the need to respect the interests of the other States ... it follows from...
principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose economic sanctions on
violator of its laws with the intent of changing... lawful conduct in other states.").
89. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 69-70 (quoting Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
90. Id. at 70 (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
91. Id. at 70-71. The court suggested that Massachusetts could have made an argument
that "expression of moral outrage about feign human rights concerns" constitutes valid local
purpose. It was then was quick to reject this argument as well.
92. Id. at 62. The court held that "in enacting the Massachusetts Burma Law the
Commonwealth has crossed over the line from market participant to market regulator." Id. at
63.
93. Id. at 63. The court distinguished this case from Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980) and Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), two cases where the Supreme
Court held that the exception applied.
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purchasing list precluded the application of the exception because the
list created "a mechanism to monitor the ongoing actions of private
actors, '94 and thus imposed restrictions on markets other than the
market for state procurement contracts.9" The court went on to
suggest that the market participant exception should not apply to
Foreign Commerce Clause cases in genera. 96
The market participant exception and the appropriateness of its
application to the facts of this case will be discussed at length in the
proceeding portion of this Note.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Background and Assumptions Underlying the Foreign Commerce
Clause
Before determining whether the market participant rule should
have been applied in Natsios, it is essential to understand the purpose
behind the Commerce Clause and the justifications behind the market
participant exception. The Commerce Clause provides that
"Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States.... "97 Although the language
of the Commerce Clause merely grants power to Congress and does
not literally restrict state action, the courts have recognized that it
includes a "negative implication" that limits the authority of states to
regulate commerce. While the courts traditionally apply this negative
implication in the context of domestic interstate commerce, the courts
have yet to establish the negative implication's scope in the context of
foreign commerce.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause's Market Participant Exception
Courts have, however, not left unchecked the negative
implication that arises from the dormant Commerce Clause. Rather,
in order to limit the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause, the
courts have adopted a doctrine commonly referred to as the "market
94. The court held that this factor made the case analogous to South-Central Timber Dev.,
Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 99 (1984).
95. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63. The court was not clear on exactly what these "other" markets
were, or how the Massachusetts law affected these markets.
96. Id. at 65. The court argued that, at the very least, it needed to be applied at a much
higher level of scrutiny. To support its argument that the exception should not apply to the
Foreign Commerce Clause, the court looked to South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 96, Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980), and Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 488. However, as the
First Circuit admitted, no court has expressly ruled on the issue.
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20011 1163
Seattle University Law Review
participant exception." The Supreme Court first applied the market
participant exception in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,98 stating
that "[n]othing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens."99 Later, in Reeves Inc. v. Stake, the Court again applied the
market participant exception, holding that South Dakota acted as a
market participant by following its policy of confining the sale of
cement to state residents during a cement shortage. 00
In market participant exception cases following Alexandria Scrap
and Reeves, the Supreme Court has applied the doctrine
inconsistently. 10 1 First, the market participant rule is not necessarily
applied in every situation in which a state merely appears to be acting
as a buyer or seller choosing a trading partner."°2 The Court, instead,
has left itself open to either recognizing an exception to the general
rule or characterizing the state as a market regulator not withstanding
its superficial appearance as market participant. 10 3  Second, when
applying the rule, Supreme Court Justices disagree on when and under
what circumstances the rule should be applied.
10 4
Thus, in order to understand how the rule should be more
consistently applied, it is essential to examine the underlying
justifications of the market participant exception. In an article that
closely examines the market participant rule, Professor Dan T.
Coenen outlines five key justifications underling the market
participant exception. These include (1) fairness, (2) a need to avoid
interference with state autonomy as consistent with federalism values,
(3) a decreased risk of dangers to Commerce Clause values, (4) formal
considerations emanating from constitutional text and history, and (5)
institutional considerations.0 5
The first justification, fairness, rests on the fundamental
distinction between state regulation or taxation and state trading in the
market place:
When a state government regulates or taxes, it turns over
98. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
99. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
100. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429.
101. See Coenen, supra note 14, at 405.
102. Id.
103. Id. (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93-99 (1984);
Wisconsin Dept. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986);
New Orleans S.S. Assoc. v. Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist., 874 F.2d 1018, 1021
(5th Cir. 1989); Transport Limousine v. Port Auth., 571 F. Supp. 576, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
104. Coenen, supra note 14, at 405.
105. Id. at 420.
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nothing that belongs to it; rather, it compels private action
through the exercise of raw governmental power. In contrast,
when a state government buys or sells, it is controlling and
distributing its own resources .... [I]t seems sensible that when
a state government distributes state resources, it may-on behalf
of all its citizens-pick and choose among the proper recipients.
An essential feature of having property is, after all, the right to
exclude others. 10
6
Therefore, under this justification of fairness, a state should be
allowed to choose where and how it will spend its own money, simply
because, as a property owner, it has the right to exclude others, and a
state should not be precluded from exercising this right simply
because a state is a group of property owners that have banded
together rather than a single individual property owner standing alone.
The second justification to the market participant rule arises
from underlying notions of federalism. 1 7 Because a state's resources
"are the state's 'own' in a way that the state's regulatory powers are
not," restricting a state's use of its own tangible resources is a greater
"intrusion of state autonomy" than to "cabin its otherwise limitless
power to coerce through government fiat."' 8 Thus, the Commerce
Clause "commands a closer scrutiny of state regulatory programs than
of state marketplace programs."'0 9 Because this justification involves
the state's sovereignty vis-i.-vis the national government, it can be
consistently applied to both the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Foreign Commerce Clause when the primary concern is whether the
state is overstepping its regulatory framework.
The third justification for the market participant exception is
that the negative impacts resulting from permitting resident
preferences in the distribution of state resources are minimal. One
reason that these market participant type preferences are less
threatening to "the underlying Commerce Clause goal of free trade in
a unified nation""' than preferential regulatory or taxing programs is
that when a state chooses to respond to political rather than economic
concerns, it is expensive for the state, especially when the state rejects
a lower priced good or service for purely political reasons. Because
these types of measures have high costs, they are less likely to
proliferate than measures that bear no such cost to the state."' Thus,
106. Id. at 422.
107. Id. at 426.
108. Id. at 427.
109. Id. at 427.
110. Id. at 430.
111. Id. at 432-33.
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when a selective purchasing law is implemented at the direct expense
of the state, the likelihood for widespread effects on free trade within
either a national or world economy will be minimal because the high
cost of such selective purchasing laws will impose a chilling effect.
The fourth justification involves textual and historical
considerations associated with the market participant exception. 112
Because the text of the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
to "regulate" interstate commerce, it follows that the scope of the
clause's negative implication must also be limited to activities that
"regulate." '113  Therefore, under a logically construed dormant
Commerce Clause theory, a state is merely prohibited from
"regulating" commerce in certain respects. Although the term
"regulate" is not defined within the Commerce Clause, it is unlikely
that an ordinary person would consider a state acting as a purchaser to
be "regulating.""' 4 This notion is further supported by the historical
perception that traders in the market are ordinarily free to deal with
whomever they wish." 5 A choice not to deal with certain entities is
not traditionally seen as a regulation, but merely a business choice,
even when the choice is based on moral rather than economic
considerations.
Finally, certain institutional considerations justify the market
participant rule. One of these considerations is that Congress remains
capable of protecting national interests in the realm of commerce, even
if the courts do not.1 ' Accordingly, if Congress decides that it would
harm national interests to allow states to pass such selective
purchasing laws, it is entirely free to pass legislation prohibiting such
laws.
Thus, after examination of both formal and institutional
considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that these justifications are
not unique to the domestic Commerce Clause. Rather, they apply to
the language and the nature of the Commerce Clause itself, and
therefore should receive equal weight under either a foreign or
domestic analysis.
1. Application of the Market Participant Exception to the Foreign
Commerce Clause
In its market participant analysis, the First Circuit glossed over
112. Id. at 436.
113. Id. at 435.
114. Id. at 435.
115. Id. at 436.
116. Id. at 439.
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the fundamental purpose of the Foreign Commerce Clause and the
justifications underlying the market participant exception when it
concluded that it is unlikely that the market participant exception
applies to the Foreign Commerce Clause.117 In addressing the purpose
of the Foreign Commerce Clause, the court stated, "[l]ike the dormant
domestic Commerce Clause ... [the Foreign Commerce Clause]
restricts protectionist policies.""' 8 The court went on to suggest that a
second purpose behind the Foreign Commerce Clause is to restrain
the states from excessive interference in foreign affairs." 9 Not only
did the court fail to cite authority when making this assertion, it also
failed to examine the justifications behind the market participant
exception. Finally, the court failed to provide any analysis as to why
these justifications would not be applicable to the Foreign Commerce
Clause.
There are, however, two reasons that the justifications discussed
in the analysis above can be applied to justify the market participant
exception in either a foreign or domestic context. First, regardless of
whether the commerce in question is foreign or domestic, the
fundamental purpose behind the Commerce Clause is, as the First
Circuit in Natsios admitted, to prevent protectionism.120 Second, upon
closer examination, the various justifications for the market participant
exception primarily focus on the relationship between the states and
the federal government.' Therefore, the justifications for the market
participant exception are applicable in the context of both foreign and
domestic commerce.
2. In Passing its Law, Massachusetts Was Acting as a Market
Participant
Even though the First Circuit in Natsios was reluctant to apply
the market participation exception in a Foreign Commerce Clause
context, it took the opportunity to hold that Massachusetts was not
acting as a market participant when it passed the Massachusetts
Burma Law. 122 In reaching its conclusion that Massachusetts was not
a market participant, the court relied heavily on the Supreme Court's
holding in Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison.1
23
117. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 65 (1st Cir. 1999).
118. Id. at 66 (citing Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178
(1999)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 66.
121. See generally Coenen, supra note 14.
122. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 62.
123. Id. at 63.
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Camps involved a Maine statute that provided certain nonprofit
entities with an exemption from real estate and personal property
taxes, so long as the institutions' activities were conducted principally
for the benefit of persons living in the state. 124 The Supreme Court in
Camps held that the market participant exception did not apply to the
tax exemption because the tax exemption could not be characterized as
a "proprietary activity. "125 The Court stated that the inquiry was
"whether the 'challenged [tax] program constituted direct state
participation in the market,"' and held that it did not.126 The Court's
holding in Camps was, therefore, narrow in that it pertained to taxing
schemes. Because the narrow Camps holding failed to provide a basis
to invalidate the Massachusetts law, which involved direct purchasing
activities rather than taxation, the First Circuit instead resorted to the
following dicta to support its conclusion that Massachusetts was not
acting as a market participant:
More recently, in Camps Newfound/Owatonna ... [t]he Court
said that the market participant exception is a narrow one,
noting that Reeves and Alexandria Scrap both involved "a
discrete activity focused on a single industry...." The court
warned against an expansion of the market participant exception
that "would swallow the rule against discriminatory tax
schemes."' 27
The First Circuit, however, incorrectly relied on this portion of
the Camps opinion as a primary basis for refusing to apply the market
participant exception. First, the Camps Court did not apply this
reasoning until after it held that tax exemptions are not the type of
activities that fall into the market participant exception, so it was not
essential to the holding. Second, a closer examination of Reeves and
Alexandria Scrap reveals that the Court, in deciding these cases, did
not, as the Camps Court arguably suggests, place emphasis on the
relative scope of the market in its application of the market participant
exception. 28
In Reeves, due to a cement shortage, the State of South Dakota
124. Camps, 520 U.S. at 569. Institutions that did not meet this requirement could
generally receive a more limited benefit under the statute.
125. Thus, when acting in the role of a market participant, a government should be able to
choose its business partners, regardless of its reasons for doing so, and regardless of whether the
business partners are foreign or domestic.
126. Camps, 520 U.S. at 593 (quoting White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1993)).
127. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 638 (quoting Camps, 520 U.S. at 594) (emphasis added).




reaffirmed its policy to limit the sale of cement made by the state-
owned plant to residents of the state. 129  A Wyoming ready-mix
concrete distributor that had relied on the cement produced by South
Dakota was denied supplies and brought suit, claiming a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause. 3 ' In holding that the state action fit
into the market participant exception, the Supreme Court considered
only the analysis provide by Alexandria Scrap:
The basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States
as market participants and States as market regulators makes
good sense and sound law. As that case explains, the Commerce
Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory
measures impeding free private trade in the national
marketplace. There is no indication of a constitutional plan to
limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the
free market. The precedents comport with this distinction.131
The Reeves Court, however, was not clear on how it applied this
doctrine to the facts of the case. It merely stated that "South Dakota,
as a seller of cement, unquestionably fits the 'market participant' label
more comfortably than a State acting to subsidize local scrap
processors."' 3 2 It concluded, "the general rule of Alexandria Scrap
plainly applies here.' 1 33 Thus, the Reeves Court gave no indication
that it relied on the fact that only a single market was affected. It is
just as plausible to assert that the Court relied on the fact that the
State was acting as a seller of goods in a market.
Alexandria Scrap does not help to clarify this point either, as it
does not specify reliance on the fact that there was only a single market
involved. In Alexandria Scrap, the State of Maryland enacted
legislation that allowed scrap metal processors, located both in and
outside the state, to collect a "bounty" for every junk car with a
Maryland title converted into scrap metal.13' The purpose of this
program was to remove abandoned automobiles from the state's
roadways and junkyards. 35  Five years after the original legislation
was passed, it was amended to require documentation for cars over
eight years old (hulks).'36 This amendment had the effect of imposing
more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state
129. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 432.
130. Id. at 433.
131. Id. at 436-37 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 440.
133. Id. at 440.
134. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 797 (1976).
135. Id. at 796.
136. Id. at 798-99.
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processors.'37 The Court did not refer to the scope of the market when
it determined that the state action fell into the market participant
exception.'38 It merely held that:
Maryland has not sought to prohibit the flow of hulks, or to
regulate the conditions under which it may occur. Instead, it has
entered into the market itself to bid up their price ... as a
purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce,
[and has restricted] its trade to its own citizens or businesses
within the State. 39
Thus, this holding does not suggest that the Court considered
Maryland's action "a discrete activity focused on a single industry"
when it determined that the market participant exception applied. 4 °
The Camps Court also cited to White when it suggested that the
Court must construe the market participant exception narrowly.' 4 '
Although the White Court did recognize that there were limits to the
market participant exception, the language relied on by the Camps
Court merely states:
We find it unnecessary in this case to define [the limits on a
state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that
reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government
transacts business] with precision, except to say that we think
the Commerce Clause does not require the city to stop at the
boundary of formal privity of contract. In this case, the Mayor's
executive order covers a discrete, identifiable class of economic
activity in which the city is a major participant. Everyone
affected by the order is, in a substantial if informal sense,
"working for the city." Wherever the limits of the market
participation exception may lie, we conclude that the executive
order in this case falls well within the scope of Alexandria Scrap
and Reeves.'
42
If anything, when viewed in light of the facts and holding in
137. Id. at 803 n.13.
138. Id. at 803, 806.
139. Reeves, Inc. v. State, 447 U.S. 429, 435 (1980) (citing Hughes, 426 U.S. at 806, 808).
According to the Reeves Court, "the [Alexandria Scrap] Court invoked this rationale after
explicitly reiterating the District Court's finding that the Maryland program imposed
'substantial burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce.' Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at
804. Moreover, the Court was willing to accept the Virginia processor's characterization of the
Maryland program as "reducing in some manner the flow of goods in interstate commerce."
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 435 n.7.
140. See Camps, 520 U.S. at 594.
141. Id. (citing White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983)).
142. White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
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White, this passage, contained in a footnote, supports Massachusetts'
position that the Burma Law fell under the market participant
exception because everyone contracting with the state is essentially
working for the state. Although it did have some downstream effects,
the Massachusetts Burma Law, like the law at issue in White, only
required contractors not to do business with Burma before or during
the time that they contracted with the state. After performing the
contract, they were free to do business with Burma. Additionally, the
law at issue in White can be considered even more restrictive than the
Massachusetts Burma Law because the latter did not categorically
exclude all businesses doing business with Burma; rather, it merely
disadvantaged them by requiring them to offer a lower bid.
Because the dicta in Camps suggests that the market participant
exception should be more readily applied to those cases involving
"discrete activity focused on a single industry,"'43 the court in Natsios
should not have relied on it to conclude that the market participant
exception did not apply.' Rather, the First Circuit should have
assessed "whether the challenged 'program constituted direct state
participation in the market."" 4 To do so properly, it would have been
important to determine whether Massachusetts was acting as a private
individual would in the market place. The Reeves court provided
helpful guidelines for such an analysis:
"[like] private individuals and businesses, the Government
enjoys the unrestricted power to produce its own supplies, to
determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the terms and
conditions upon which it will make needed purchases." While
acknowledging that there may be limits on this sweepingly
phrased principle, we cannot ignore the similarities of private
businesses and public entities when they function in the
marketplace.'46
Massachusetts, in passing the Burma Law, appears to fit neatly
into the category of private individual, as it used the Burma Law as a
mechanism for determining with whom it would deal, and under what
terms and conditions. Therefore, because of its functional role in the
market place, Massachusetts was acting as a market participant when
it passed the Burma Law.
143. Camps, 520 U.S. at 594.
144. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63.
145. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 435 n.7 (quoting Justice Powell's dissent at 451). This was the
question posed in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves.
146. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 n.12 (emphasis in original) (quoting Perkins v. Lukens Steel
Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although the First Circuit held that the Massachusetts Burma
Law was unconstitutional for many reasons, both the First Circuit and
the Supreme Court should have recognized that the market participant
exception shielded the state from violating the Foreign Commerce
Clause by passing the law. By failing to consider the justifications
behind the rule, the First Circuit overly limited the market participant
exception. Under its interpretation, states are wrongfully precluded
from choosing their foreign trading partners. Not only are states
stripped of their choice to do business with foreign countries, but they
are also precluded from imposing many of their own terms on these
business transactions. This outcome could prove to be troublesome
given the increasing globalization of domestic economics and the
continuing removal of trade barriers, leaving a plethora of tough
choices for both states and individuals who wish to use consumer
choice as a mechanism to foster human rights and environmental
protection.
The Massachusetts Burma Law provided the state with a feasible
framework for dealing with these tough consumer choices, and it was a
prime candidate for the market participant exception. Although it
appears that the circumstances surrounding the Massachusetts Burma
Law, including the federal legislation and the list of actors involved,
placed the it on a path destined toward failure, a more favorable
holding by the courts regarding the market participant exception
would have allowed the law to be used as a model for other local
governments wishing to exercise their consumer choice in a manner
consistent with the greater good.
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